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The burdens of a recession are not spread evenly across demographic groups. The public and 
media, for example, noticed that, from the start of the current recession in December 2007 
through June 2009, men accounted for more than three quarters of net job losses. Other 
differences have garnered less attention, but are just as interesting. During the same period, the 
employment of single people fell at more than twice the rate that it did for married people, while 
black employment fell at one-and-a-half times the rate that white employment did. To have a 
more complete understanding about what recessions mean for people, this paper examines the 
different effects of this and previous recessions on employment experiences across a range of 
demographic categories: sex, marital status, race, age, and education level.  
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  Since the U.S. economy entered into its current recession in December 2007, steep job 
losses have been seen for most demographic groups and industries. By standard measures of 
overall labor-market performance, the news has been dire: Between the fourth quarter of 2007 
and the third quarter of 2009, nonfarm employment fell by about 6.8 million jobs while the 
unemployment rate rose from 4.8 percent to 9.6 percent.   
  Although the overall picture has been bleak, the bad news has not been distributed evenly 
across demographic groups. The difference between men and women has garnered the most 
attention because, by the second quarter of 2009, men accounted for 76 percent of the job losses, 
despite having been only a slim majority (51 percent) of nonfarm employment at the start of the 
recession. In light of the disproportionate employment effects of the recession on men, some 
commentators in the press and elsewhere have labeled the current recession a “man-cession” or 
even the “Great Man-Cession.”  
  This paper takes the different effects on men and women as a starting point and examines 
the employment experiences across a range of other demographic categories—marital status, 
race, age, and education. The purpose is to understand more about what recessions mean for 
people. Such information will, hopefully, give us an idea of what needs to be done to address the 
effects of the current recession and to better prepare for future ones. 
 
WHY LOOK AT DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES? 
  The dominant explanation for the “man-cession” is that it follows from differences in the 
severity of the recession across industries. Men “are bearing the brunt of the current economic 
crisis because they predominate in manufacturing and construction, the hardest-hit sectors,” says 
Christina Hoff Sommers of the American Enterprise Institute. Women, on the other hand, “are a 2 
 
majority in recession-resistant fields, such as education and health care,” she says. Harvard 
economist Greg Mankiw echoes this in his blog, conjecturing “that a large part of the explanation 
is the sectoral mix of this particular downturn in economic activity, including a significant slump 
in residential construction.”  
  Job losses have, indeed, been steepest in the goods-producing industries—natural 
resources and mining, construction, and manufacturing—which accounted for about half of total 
losses. Job losses were not the rule across all industries, however, as the education and health 
service sector actually saw an increase of 768,000 jobs, while the government sector added 
115,000 jobs.  
  Despite the sudden interest in the phenomenon, the large difference in the relative effects 
of the recession on the employment of men and women is not unusual. Men always bear the 
brunt of the job losses during recessions; and, compared with previous recessions, men have 
actually been bearing a smaller proportion of job losses. Between 1969 and 1991, male 
employment fell by an average of 3.1 percent during the five recessions experienced during the 
period. Female employment, on the other hand, actually tended to rise by an average of 0.3 
percent during recessions.
1 
Women have a much larger presence in the workforce now than they 
did between 1969 and 1991, however, so a more relevant comparison is to the 2001 recession. 
For that recession, employment peaked in the first quarter of 2001 and bottomed out in the third 
quarter of 2003, with a total loss of a little over 2.6 million jobs. Men accounted for 78 percent of 
those job losses, similar to the current recession.
2
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So, in terms of job losses, the current recession 
has hit men in roughly the same proportion as did the previous recession, but by a much smaller 
proportion than was the case in earlier recessions.  
2 Note that data splitting nonfarm employment by sex was available only up through the second quarter of 2009 at 
the time this paper was being prepared. 3 
 
  The difference between the sexes is only one of the interesting and significant differences 
in the effects of the recession across demographic groups. The level of nonfarm employment, 
which is a measure of the number of jobs at firms, is produced by the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) and is derived from a monthly survey of 150,000 or so employers around the country. 
These data are not broken down by demographic categories other than sex; but, fortunately, the 
BLS also surveys households on a monthly basis and categorizes the responses by demographic 
categories.  
  Employment measures from the payroll and household surveys are not the same in that 
they cover different types of employment. For example, payroll employment does not include 
farm employment or self-employment. Nevertheless, the two employment measures capture the 
same broad patterns in male/ female employment. In fact, by fortunate coincidence, the 
household survey indicates the same 76/24 split in the male/female employment losses between 
the fourth quarter of 2007 and the second quarter of 2009 that appeared in the nonfarm 
employment data discussed above.  
  The differences in household employment by sex, marital status, and race from the fourth 
quarter of 2007 through the third quarter of 2009 are illustrated by Figure 1. Whereas total 
employment losses amounted to 4.7 percent, male employment fell by 6.4 percent and female 
employment fell by 2.9 percent. Similarly, large differences in employment losses have occurred 
according to marital status and race: Employment of single adults fell at nearly twice the rate as 
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  Figure 2 breaks down employment changes by age groups, indicating much larger-than-
average employment losses for those aged 16-19, 20-24, and 35-44. In contrast, employment 
among those aged 55 and older actually rose by 4 percent. Unsurprisingly, there have also been 
significant differences in changes in employment across education levels. As reported in Figure 
3, for example, employment of those without a high school diploma fell by 7.5 percent while 
employment for those with at least a bachelor’s degree actually rose by 0.4 percent. 
Figure 2 
Figure 3 
  So what accounts for the variation in the employment changes across these demographic 
groups?  The oft-cited story for the difference between the sexes is that it is a reflection of what 
has happened to industries. As discussed below, this is not a terribly satisfying explanation, but it 
does make some sense. Analogous explanations are not likely to fit the other demographic 
categories, however.  
  For example, perhaps single people are more heavily concentrated in industries that were 
hit hardest by the recession, but it is difficult to imagine why that would be so. It is much easier 
to imagine instead that single people might have lost proportionally more jobs because the 
average single person is younger and, therefore, less experienced and less educated than the 
average married person. Because of these differences, we would expect that, within a given 
industry, single people would bear disproportionate job losses.  
  The industry story might not even be a good causal explanation for the differences 
between sexes. As discussed by Wall (2009), because men tended to have been affected 
disproportionately across all industries, the story behind the “man-cession” cannot be about 
industry mix alone but must have something to do with demographic differences. For example, 5 
 
men are less likely than women to have attended college, a fact that is consistent with their 
relative job losses.  
  More generally, it is not a simple matter to separate the role of industry from the role of 
demographics. For example, is the decrease in employment larger for manufacturing than for 
other industries because it experienced a larger external shock than did other industries? Or, was 
the shock the same across sectors, but job losses in manufacturing were greater because its 
workers, on average, have lower education levels than do workers in other sectors? Put another 
way, would there have been fewer job losses in manufacturing if workers in the sector had higher 
education levels? There is no simple answer to these questions because there is no proximate 
cause for what happened in manufacturing that was different from, say, professional and 
business services. The recession experience may have differed between the two sectors because 
they experienced different external shocks; or perhaps they experienced the same external shock, 
but the demographic differences of their workforce led to different outcomes. Most likely, it is 
some combination of the two explanations that accounts for the different employment outcomes. 
  The questions can be turned around to refer to demographic groups: Are the different 
impacts of the recession across demographic groups attributable to the industries in which the 
groups are employed or to the differences in the groups’ characteristics? Again, the most likely 
explanation is that demographic groups have not seen the same employment losses because of 
some combination of the differences in industries in which the groups are employed and the 
different labor-market characteristics of the groups. 
 6 
 
WHAT ARE THE EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS OF A RECESSION? 
  When the word “recession” is used to describe specific periods of economic weakness, it 
refers most often to the official recession dates determined by the business-cycle-dating 
committee of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). When weighing their 
decisions whether to label a period a recession, NBER committee members take into account a 
wide variety of economic indicators. As a result, NBER dates for recessions tend to coincide 
most closely with periods in which the broadest measure of economic activity, real Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), is contracting. It used to be that NBER recession periods coincided 
with periods of falling employment. Beginning with the 1990-91 recession, however, this link 
was broken; and the economy experienced a prolonged period of job losses well after the end of 
the official recession. Such a so-called “jobless recovery” also occurred in the wake of the 2001 
recession.  
  This disjoint between official recessions and falling employment means that it is not 
possible to use NBER recession dates to compare the effects of recent recessions to earlier ones. 
For pre-1990 recessions, one could measure the change in employment from the beginning to the 
end of an official recession and obtain a reasonably complete picture of the recession’s 
employment effects. For post-1990 recessions, however, the full effects of a recession on 
employment were not realized until after the recession ended, and at times even began before the 
onset of the official recession.  
  We need, therefore, an alternative metric for determining the period during which 
recessions affected employment. Keep in mind that using this different metric will mean that 
estimates of the effects of the current recession on the various demographic groups will differ 
somewhat from what is illustrated in Figures 1-3. Nonetheless, the scale of the effects and the 7 
 
comparisons across categories within demographic groups are the same with either set of 
numbers.  
  Fortunately, there is a fairly straightforward statistical method for determining the timing 
of recessions: a Markov-switching model. Briefly, the model takes any data series, which in our 
case is household employment, and estimates growth rates that are typical for expansionary and 
recessionary phases. At the same time, the model decides for each data point the phase that best 
describes that period, taking into account the periods immediately prior. For example, positive 
employment growth that has persisted for many periods will be called an expansionary period, 
while negative growth that has persisted for many periods will be called a recessionary period. 
The tougher job is deciding on the more ambiguous periods—such as when growth is positive 
for one period following several periods of negative growth or when a period has middling 
growth—so that it is not obvious if the period should be labeled part of a recession. We will 
leave it to the model to decide these tough questions so that there will be a consistent application 
across recessions.
4
  The estimated periods for which household employment was in recession for each of the 
six official recessions since 1974 are provided in Appendix A, along with a figure comparing the 
growth rate of household employment to the official NBER recession dates. The figure shows 
that employment growth first dipped below zero in early 2007, months before the start of the 
official recession, and remained weak thereafter. As a consequence, the last three quarters of 
 
 
                                                           
4 See Owyang, Piger, and Wall (2008) for a technical description of the statistical methodology and for results using 
aggregate payroll employment. A quarter is designated as recessionary if the probability of recession exceeds 50 
percent. 8 
 
2007 are classified as recessionary, meaning that household employment was in recession three 




THE TOTAL EFFECTS OF RECESSIONS ON TOTAL EMPLOYMENT 
  Once the timing of official recessions is disentangled from the periods during which they 
are affecting employment, the total employment changes related to the current recession can be 
calculated and compared to those of earlier recessions. The percent changes in total employment 
during each of the estimated recession periods are provided in the second column of Table 1. The 
most notable result in the column is that the 4.6 percent employment loss from the current 
recession dwarfs those of the other five, which were in the 1 percent to 2 percent range. 
Table 1 
  Typically, the effects of a recession on employment are seen as simply the difference 
between the levels of employment at the start and end of a recessionary period, as in the second 
column of Table 1. This assumes, though, that there would have been zero employment growth 
even if there had been no recession. However, the recession not only causes a drop in 
employment from the pre-recession level, it also prevents employment growth that would have 
occurred. This “foregone” employment is also an effect of the recession and needs to be 
accounted for in an analysis of the recession’s total effects on employment. The insert provides a 
diagrammatic explanation of the total costs of the recession on employment. 
Insert Diagram Box 
  The most straightforward way to account for foregone employment is to assume that 
employment would have grown at some typical rate if the recession had not occurred. We also 
                                                           
5 Note that the disjoint between official recessions and household employment recessions is not as severe as might 
have been expected. This is because household employment tends to recover earlier than payroll employment, which 
is the measure most often used in discussions of jobless recoveries. 9 
 
must account for differences in growth rates before and after the mid-1980s, when the so-called 
“Great Moderation” meant significantly less variability in the growth of a wide range of 
economic variables. Specifically, I assume as relevant that, during a recession, employment 
would have grown at its median growth rate for the periods 1972-84 and 1985-2009.  
  The third column of Table 1 shows estimates of the employment growth that was 
foregone during each of the six recessions. In terms of foregone employment, the current 
recession is not particularly onerous. Although foregone employment has been above average, it 
has been much smaller than for the 1981-82 recession, primarily because median employment 
growth pre-1985 was higher than post-1985. Nonetheless, by combining foregone employment 
with the employment decline, the total effect of the current recession is the highest among the six 
recessions examined, with only the 1981-82 recession coming close. 
  In the subsequent section, a similar exercise is performed for a variety of demographic 
categories. Specifically, the exercise shows the effects of the current recession by sex and 
compares them to previous recessions. It then does this, in turn, for marital status, race, and age, 
with extra attention paid to the differences between men and women for each category. 
 
THE RECESSION ACROSS DEMOGRAPHIC CATEGORIES 
  When calculating foregone employment, one must also consider the sometimes large 
differences in typical growth across demographic categories. For reference, the different 
employment trends are summarized in Appendix B, which provides employment-to-population 
ratios for 1972-2009 for the demographic categories examined below. As with total employment 
in the previous section, I assume, as relevant, that, during a recession, employment for each 10 
 




 (See Appendix C.) 
Sex 
  As already mentioned, men always bear the brunt of employment losses during 
recessions, and the current recession has been no different. This is true whether one looks at 
payroll employment, as earlier studies have, or at household employment, as this study does. As 
reported in Table 2, male household employment has fallen 2.46 times the rate that female 
employment has (-6.4 percent vs. -2.6 percent) during the current recession. Looking at earlier 
recessions, it is clear that the current one is actually in the lower half in terms of the relative 
effect on men. During the two recessions in the 1980s, male and female employment moved in 
opposite directions, while during the 1990-91 recession, male employment fell nearly seven 
times the rate that female employment did. The 1974-75 recession was somewhat comparable to 
the current recession in the relative employment loss for men, but the 2001 recession saw male 
employment fall only slightly more than female employment. 
Table 2 
  The story of the current recession changes a great deal when foregone employment is 
considered. As reported in Figure 4, male foregone employment has been only 62 percent that of 
women. This is because employment growth for women has tended to be higher than that for 
men during the entire sample period—meaning that, for every quarter of recession, more female 
than male employment is foregone. Adding the two effects together reveals that men as a whole 
                                                           
6 This break point will also take account of the significant decrease in female employment growth that occurred after 
1990 as the rapid increases in women’s labor-force participation that had been occurring wound down. 11 
 
have still borne a much larger effect of the recession, but it is 1.33 times the effect for women 
rather than being 2.46 times it, as suggested by the employment changes alone. 
Figure 4 
  Now that we know the total employment effects of the current recession, how does it 
compare to earlier ones? Has it been the “Great Man-Cession”?  Figure 5 shows the total effects 
of the six recessions since 1974 on male and female employment, along with the relative effect 
for men and women. For both sexes, this has been the most costly recession in terms of 
employment. Male employment is 8.9 percent lower than it would have been without a recession, 
which is rivaled only by the total effect of the 1981-82 recession. For women, the current 
recession is somewhat similar to the 1981-82 recession, when female employment actually rose 
(recall Table 2). However, because female employment growth pre-1985 was much higher than 





  The male/female ratio for the current recession, 1.33, is surpassed only by the 1980 
recession and is much higher than for all other recessions. So, even though it’s not quite the 
“Great Man-Cession,” it’s still been relatively more severe for men than is usual. Interestingly, 
the estimates also indicate that the total effects of the 2001 recession were actually higher for 
women than for men. Recall from Table 2 that employment losses for men and women did not 
differ by much, so the higher foregone employment for women meant a higher total effect. 
 
                                                           
7 A recent paper by DiCecio et al. (2008) reviews changes in labor force participation, separating out trends from the 
changes due to economic conditions. 12 
 
Marital Status 
  Over the course of the current recession, the employment of married people has fallen at 
76 percent of the rate that employment of single people has fallen (Figure 6). Married 
employment fell by 4 percent while single employment fell by 5.3 percent. Because single 
employment has tended to grow much faster than married employment since 1985, the foregone 
employment for singles during the recession has been much larger. Adding up the two effects, 
the total effect of the recession for married people has been 67 percent as large as the total effect 
for single people.  
Figure 6 
  The relative effects of this recession on married and single workers are typical of what 
has happened across the previous five recessions (Figure 7). Single people have almost always 
borne a greater total effect, although, because the median employment growth for singles is 
lower than it was before 1985, the foregone employment for singles was relatively less important 
for the last two recessions. With the exception of the 1980 recession, married people saw 
between 50 percent and 80 percent of the total effect that single people did. For the 1980 
recession, employment for singles, particularly single women, was higher at the end of the 
recession than at the beginning. As we have seen, that recession was really one that hit men the 
hardest relative to other categories. 
Figure 7 
  An interesting difference between married and singles is in the comparisons of men and 
women (Figure 8). In the current recession, married men and women saw smaller job losses than 
did their single counterparts, meaning that married women saw the smallest reduction in 





  According to this effect, some married women enter the labor force 
during recessions following their husbands’ job losses. The added-worker effect can account for 
the fact that the number of women in the labor force, either employed or looking for 
employment, has actually risen during the recession, whereas the male labor force has fallen.  
  Another explanation for the difference between married and single people is that married 
people are more likely to have children to support and are, therefore, more likely to take a new 
job at lower pay after they lose their old job. Also, much of the differences for marital status are 
reflections of other demographic differences that make them more likely to be affected by a 
recession: Compared to married people, single people tend to be younger (i.e., have less work 
experience) and have lower education levels. 
 
White and Black 
  As with all demographic groups, the differences across racial categories are intertwined 
with differences across other categories as well. For example, black men, for whom average 
education is lower than for black women or whites, saw the largest decrease in employment. 
Black women, on the other hand, have seen the most foregone employment of any of these sex-
race categories. Underlying these differences is the long-term trend of women, especially black 
women, becoming more likely to be employed. (See Appendices B and C.)   
The white-black employment effects of the current recession are illustrated by Figure 9, 
which indicates that white employment has fallen at 58 percent of the rate that black employment 
has (-4.4 percent vs. -7.5 percent). Because black employment has tended to grow faster than 
                                                           
8 See, for example, Stephens (2002). DeRiviere (2008) has estimated the size of a related effect called the “pin-
money” hypothesis. 14 
 
white employment, white foregone employment has been only 79 percent that of black foregone 
employment. 
Figure 9 
  Figure 10 shows the relative total effects of the last six recessions on black and white 
employment. Recent recessions have actually tended to affect black employment relatively more 
than they used to, even as blacks have become more successful in the labor market. For the last 
three recessions, the ratio of white-to-black total effects has been between 0.65 and 0.74, after it 
had been above 1 for the two recessions of the 1980s, indicating that white employment had 
suffered more. In part, this change over time is because the gap between white and black 
employment growth has reversed. 
Figure 10 
  It is worth breaking out the two employment effects (employment change and foregone 
employment) for all six recessions to see how the white/black ratios have been changing over 
time (Figure 11). Before 1985, white employment grew at a median rate of 2.5 percent per year, 
whereas the analogous number for black employment was 2.1 percent. Thus, there was more 
foregone white employment for each quarter of recession. Since 1985, however, median white 
employment growth has fallen by half, whereas median black employment growth has fallen by 
only one quarter. The ratio of direct employment changes has also fallen over time, meaning that 
the direct employment change used to be relatively smaller for blacks than it has become. (The 
1974-75 recession, however, hit black employment much harder than white employment.) As a 
consequence, blacks tend to bear a relatively larger burden during recessions now than they used 
to. 
Figure 11 15 
 
  In a sense, it is the recent success in labor markets that has made the total effects of 
recessions on blacks greater than in the past. As already discussed, black employment has been 
growing faster than white employment, so each quarter of recession means a greater loss of 
employment for blacks. Also, because black participation in the labor market is higher than in 
the past, while black education and experience still lag that of whites, more blacks are vulnerable 
to the effects of recession than had been the case earlier. 
  I have alluded to white/black differences in the relative effects of recessions on men and 
women. This is illustrated for the current recession by Figure 12, which shows that the total 
effect on white men and women is smaller than that on black men and women, respectively. 
Also, the total effect on white men is 59 percent greater than that on white women, while the 
total effect on black men is 18 percent higher than that on black women. This difference is 
because black women have seen a much larger decline in employment than have white women (-
5.3 percent vs. -2.3 percent) while also seeing more foregone employment because black 
women’s median growth rate is nearly twice that of white women. Just as described for black 
employment overall, this story is really a side effect of the labor market success of black women, 
who have seen rapid employment growth relative to black men and white women. 
Figure 12 
 
White and Other 
  The race category “Other” captures all who are neither white nor black and has become 
an increasingly important category in the labor market: In 1972, the Other category accounted 
for 1.2 percent of total employment, but by the third quarter of 2009 it had risen to 7 percent.
9
                                                           
9 At the start of 1972, the white and black shares of employment were 89.4 percent and 9.4 percent, respectively. By 
the third quarter of 2009 the shares were 82.3 percent and 10.7 percent. 
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Over that period, the composition of the category has changed a great deal, reflecting large 
influxes of immigrants from China, India, and other Asian countries. In 2007, the average 
education level of the group was much higher than for the population as a whole, which is 
reflected in the group’s employment performance during the recession.  
  As depicted by Figure 13, the Other group has seen a drop in employment that is about 
half that of whites. On the other hand, because median employment growth for the group is 
nearly three times that of whites, the group’s foregone employment during the current recession 
has been almost triple that of whites. In total then, employment for the group is estimated to be 
10.9 percent lower than if the recession had not occurred. This effect is of roughly the same 
magnitude as for blacks, but for very different reasons. The bulk of the effect for blacks was 
from a drop in employment, whereas for people in the Other category the bulk of the effect was 
from foregone employment. 
Figure 13 
  It has only been in the past two recessions that the Other category experienced a larger 
total effect than did whites (Figure 14). During the four earlier recessions, employment of this 
group rose by between 3.3 percent and 9.3 percent, whereas negative employment changes are 
the current norm. So, despite large foregone employment during recessions, the total effects of 
recessions on the group used to be relatively small. 
Figure 14 
  Unlike the other two race categories, men and women in the Other category have seen 
similar total effects from the current recession (Figure 15). Just as with the total effects over 
time, this equality of the sexes is a recent phenomenon. For example, for the earliest three 





  The different effects of the current recession are stark when they are broken down by age 
groups. Teen employment fell by 23.8 percent during the recession, whereas employment of 
those aged 55 and older rose by 7.4 percent (Figure 16). The 20-24 and 35-44 age groups also 
suffered significant employment declines, while the employment drop for the 45-54 age group 
was relatively minor. 
Figure 16 
  One reason the 55-plus age group has seen increased employment during the current 
recession is the effect of the recession on the decision to retire. A dominant feature of the 
recession has been a significant collapse of stock prices and the resulting devaluation of many 
people’s retirement savings. So, instead of retiring, large numbers of this age group have elected 
to remain employed, thereby suppressing the normal effect that the recession would have had. In 
fact, employment of this age group was higher than it would have been without a recession: It 
grew by 7.4 percent during the recession, but, without a recession, it would have grown by 5.5 
6.1 percent. This leaves a total effect of an increase in employment of 1.4 percent. From these 
numbers, it is not possible to determine the number of people who were pushed into employment 
because of the collapse of retirement savings. The push effect is something greater than 1.4 
percent because that number is the push effect minus the decrease in the demand for these 
workers that resulted from the recession. 
  At the other end of the age spectrum, the total effect on employment for the group aged 
16-19 was the same as its employment change. Foregone employment was almost zero because 18 
 
there has been effectively no trend employment growth for this age group. The share of the 
population of this group that is employed has been falling steadily over time, even when the 
economy is not in recession. (See Appendix B.)  
  As the group with the lowest average education and the least experience, it is not 
surprising that teenagers have borne a much bigger-than-average burden of the recession. We 
need to be careful, however, before attributing the entire change in employment to the recession. 
The federal minimum wage rose in the middle of the recession in 2008 and would have had its 
largest negative employment impacts on the two youngest age groups. A majority of those 
working at or below the minimum wage in 2008 were under 25 years of age, and almost half of 
those were teenagers.  
The age breakdown also provides interesting insights into the nature of the relatively 
large effect that the recession has had on men. The three oldest groups saw relatively similar 
effects on men and women (Figure 17). For the 25-34 age group, on the other hand, the total 
effect on men has been 2.5 times the total effect on women. Therefore, any explanation of the 
“man-cession” must include a discussion of the role of age. 
Figure 17 
 
THE ROLE OF EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT 
  The final demographic category is educational attainment, which, because of its 
importance as a causal factor in the results across all other categories, warrants its own section. 
Figure 18 breaks down the effect of the current recession according to educational attainment. 
Keep in mind that the employment data by educational attainment includes only those aged 25 19 
 
and older. This gives a better idea of the employment effects once people achieve their highest 
education level. 
Figure 18 
  The employment change during the recession has been greatest for those without a high 
school diploma, followed by those who have completed high school but have not attended any 
college. Employment for those with some college fell slightly, while for those with a bachelor’s 
degree actually rose during the recession. Because trends across these groups differ a great deal, 
so do the estimates of their foregone employment. Specifically, employment for those without a 
high school diploma has been trending down for many years, so part of the decrease in 
employment during the recession would have occurred anyway. Correcting for this, the total 
effect of the recession on the employment of those without a high school diploma has been a 
drop of 13.2 percent. Above-average effects have also been experienced by those with a high 
school diploma but no college. The total effect on those with at least a bachelor’s degree has also 
been larger than average because foregone employment for this group was the highest among the 
four categories. 
  Using Figure 19, it is possible to map the results for educational attainment onto the 
results across other demographic groups. Specifically, recall that the effect of the current 
recession on men has been 1.33 times its effect on women. Figure 19 shows that men are less 
likely to have completed high school, whereas women are much more likely to have some 
college (particularly an associate degree in the nearly recession-proof nursing profession). Recall 
also that the effect of the recession on single people has been much greater than it has been on 
married people. From Figure 19, we can see that single people aged 25 and older are much more 20 
 
likely to not have a high school diploma or to have only a high school diploma. They are also 
much less likely to have a bachelor’s degree. 
Figure 19 
  Educational attainment across racial categories maps just as easily onto the employment 
effects described in previous sections. Relative to white employment, the effect of the current 
recession on black employment is larger primarily because of larger direct decreases in 
employment. In contrast, the effect on the employment of those in the Other category is also 
larger than for whites, but this is primarily because of higher foregone employment. Relative to 
whites, blacks are much less likely to have a bachelor’s degree and more likely to have a high 
school degree or less (Figure 20). For those in the Other category, those aged 25 and older are 
much more likely to have a bachelor’s degree or higher. 
Figure 20 
  It is not possible to conclude from the analysis here that educational attainment is the 
primary determinant of the extent to which a recession affects employment across demographic 
groups. Other factors—such as the industries where people tend to be employed, job experience, 
cultural differences, etc.—clearly matter, also. Nevertheless, any discussion of the effects of a 
recession across demographic groups should have educational attainment as one of the first, if 
not the first, factor that is considered. 
 

























In the diagram, the solid line is the actual path that employment followed over time, including 
a recession with falling employment. The dotted line is the path that employment would have 
followed if the recession had not occurred. This is an extremely stylized diagram that assumes that 
employment growth is constant and positive during expansionary periods and constant and negative 
during recessions. The direct change in the level of employment is C-B, the difference between the 
levels of employment at the end and at the beginning of the recession. If the recession had not 
occurred, the level of employment would have continued to rise and would have reached level A at 
the time that the recession ended. Thus, the total effect of the recession on employment is C-A, with 
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Total Effects of 2007-2009 Recession: Hispanics 
  Over the course of the current recession, Hispanic employment has not fallen by as much 
as overall employment (-3.4 percent vs. -4.6 percent), and, for both men and women, Hispanic 
employment has fallen by at least one percentage point less than overall employment has. On the 
other hand, because Hispanic employment has tended to grow at almost twice the rate of overall 
employment, these simple employment changes do not capture the whole story. Specifically, 
whereas overall foregone employment has been 3.3 percent, Hispanic foregone employment has 
been 6.1 percent, with similar numbers for men and women. In total, the recession has hit 
Hispanic employment relatively hard, resulting in employment that is 9.5 percent lower than it 
would have been if the recession had not occurred. As with overall employment, the effects of the 
recession have been more severe for Hispanic men, who have borne about a 40 percent larger 
total effect than have Hispanic women. For Hispanics, however, the difference between men and 




















































Total Effects of 2007-09 Recession: Hispanics
Total Men Women Men/Women
    
 
 
Household-Employment Growth Rate, 1972-2009 
Quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted 
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The Timing of Official Recessions and Employment Recessions 
Recession  NBER Dates  Household Employment Dates 
1974-75  1974.Q1 through 1975.Q1  1974.Q4 through 1975.Q2 
1980  1980.Q2 through 1980.Q3  1980.Q2 through 1980.Q3 
1981-82  1981.Q4 through 1982.Q4  1981.Q3 through 1983.Q1 
1990-91  1990.Q4 through 1991.Q1  1990.Q2 through 1991.Q4 
2001  2001.Q2 through 2001.Q4  2001.Q2 through 2002.Q1 
2007-09  2008.Q1 through ?  2007.Q2 through ? 
The official recession dates are determined by the National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER).  The dates for household employment recessions are estimated 








Employment-to-Population Ratio for the Sexes, 1972-2009 
Overall, by Marital Status and by Race 
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Total Across Groups25 
 
Employment-to-Population Ratio for the Sexes, 1972-2009 
Age Groups 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Median Employment Growth Rates, Men versus Women 
 
 Aggregate and by Marital Status 
  Aggregate  Married  Single 
  1972-84  1985-2009  1972-84  1985-2009  1972-84  1985-2009 
Total  2.5  1.3  1.6  1.0  3.7  1.7 
Men  1.9  1.0  0.7  0.7  4.7  1.6 
Women  3.4  1.7  3.4  0.9  3.7  1.4 
 By Race 
  White  Black  Other 
  1972-84  1985-2009  1972-84  1985-2009  1972-84  1985-2009 
Total  2.5  1.2  2.1  1.5  8.0  3.3 
Men  1.7  1.0  2.0  1.0  9.0  3.3 
Women  3.1  1.2  3.0  2.2  4.6  4.4 
 
By Age Group 
  Ages 16-19  Ages 20-24  Ages 25-34  Ages 35-44  Ages 45-54  Ages 55+ 
  1972-84  1985-2009  1972-84  1985-2009  1972-84  1985-2009  1972-84  1985-2009  1972-84  1985-2009  1972-84  1985-2009 
Total  -0.4  0.0  2.4  -0.6  5.3  -0.2  3.6  1.2  0.1  3.1  -0.1  2.4 
Men  -0.4  -0.5  2.2  -0.8  4.1  -0.4  2.5  1.1  -0.4  2.5  -0.6  2.0 
Women  -0.2  -0.8  2.6  -0.3  5.9  0.1  5.0  1.7  0.7  3.2  0.4  2.8 
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Employment Changes by Age Groups
2007.Q4-2009.Q3

























































Employment Changes by Education Levels
2007.Q4-2009.Q3

















   
Total % Effects of Recessions on Employment 





1974-75  -2.0  -1.9  -3.9 
1980  -1.0  -1.3  -2.2 
1981-82  -1.7  -4.4  -6.0 
1990-91  -1.2  -2.3  -3.5 
2001  -1.2  -1.3  -2.5 
2007-09  -4.6  -3.3  -7.9 
Average  -1.9  -2.4  -4.3 
The recession dates and the employment data are for the household 
employment series produced by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
% Effects of Recessions on Employment 
Recession  Men  Women  Men/Women 
1974-75  -2.8  -0.9  3.10 
1980  -1.7  0.0  -58.12 
1981-82  -3.3  0.5  -6.76 
1990-91  -2.0  -0.3  6.90 
2001  -1.2  -1.1  1.13 
2007-09  -6.4  -2.6  2.46 
Average  -2.9  -0.7  3.99 
The recession dates and the employment data are for the household 
employment series produced by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Table 1 






























































































Total Effects of Recessions: Men versus Women
Men Women Men/Women
Figure 4 




























































































Total Effects of Recessions: Married versus Single
Married Single Married/Single
Figure 6 
















































Total Effects of 2007-09 Recession: 
Marital Status and Men versus Women
Men Women Men/Women


























































































Total Effects of Recessions: White versus Black
White Black White/Black
Figure 9 





















































The Two Employment Effects of Recessions: White versus Black




































Total Effects of 2007-09 Recession: 
White and Black and Men versus Women
Men Women Men/Women
Figure 11 

































































































Total Effects of Recessions: White versus Other
White Other White/Other
Figure 14 












































Total Effects of 2007-09 Recession: 
White and Other and Men versus Women
Men Women Men/Women























































Total Effects of 2007-09 Recession: Age Groups













































Total Effects of 2007-09 Recession: 
Age Groups and Men versus Women
Men Women Men/Women
Figure 16 



























































Total Effects of 2007-09 Recession: Education Level
No High School Diploma
High School Diploma
Some College (including 
Associates)
Bachelors Degree or 
Higher













Male Female Married Single
No High School Diploma
High School Diploma
Some College (including 
Associates Degree)
Bachelors Degree or 
Higher
Educational Attainment, 25 years and Older: 2007 


































White  Black Other
No High School Diploma
High School Diploma
Some College (including 
Associates Degree)
Bachelors Degree or 
Higher
Educational Attainment, 25 years and Older: 2007 
Difference from the Total, Race
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Figure 19 
Figure 20 